Sequential investment in renewable energy technologies under policy uncertainty by Sendstad, L. H. & Chronopoulos, M.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Sendstad, L. H. and Chronopoulos, M. ORCID: 0000-0002-3858-2021 (2020). 
Sequential investment in renewable energy technologies under policy uncertainty. Energy 
Policy, 137, 111152.. doi: 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111152 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/23815/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111152
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
Energy Policy 137 (2020) 111152
Available online 4 December 20190301-4215/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Sequential investment in renewable energy technologies under policyuncertaintyLars Hegnes Sendstad a,∗, Michail Chronopoulos b,c
a Department of Industrial Economics & Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science & Technology, 7491 Trondheim, Norwayb City, University of London, Cass Business School, EC1Y 8TZ London, UKc Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business & Management Science, 5045 Bergen, Norway
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:Investment analysisReal optionsRenewable energyPolicy uncertainty
A B S T R A C T
Although innovation and support schemes are among the main forces that drive investment in renewableenergy (RE) technologies, both involve considerable uncertainty. We develop a real options frameworkto analyse the impact of technological, policy and electricity price uncertainty on the decision to investsequentially in successively improved versions of a RE technology. Technological uncertainty is reflected inthe random arrival of innovations, and policy uncertainty in the likely provision or retraction of a subsidythat takes the form of a fixed premium on top of the electricity price. We show that greater likelihood ofsubsidy retraction (provision) lowers (raises) the incentive to invest, and, by comparing a stepwise to a lumpyinvestment strategy, we show how an embedded option to adopt an improved technology version mitigates theimpact of subsidy retraction on investment timing. Specifically, we show how stepwise investment facilitatesearlier technology adoption compared to lumpy investment, and that, under stepwise investment, technologicaluncertainty accelerates technology adoption, thus further offsetting the incentive to delay investment in thelight of subsidy retraction.
1. Introduction
Investment in renewable energy (RE) technologies is considerablyrisky, since it is typically made in the light of various interacting uncer-tainties, including economic, technological and policy uncertainty. In-deed, not only innovations arrive at random points in time, but schemesthat support their adoption are revised frequently, thus increasing thelikelihood of unreliable long-term investment signals. Consequently,within an environment of increasing economic uncertainty, the chal-lenge of timely technology adoption becomes rather formidable andnot only threatens the viability of private firms, but also impacts uponthe possible effectiveness of achieving in a timely way the new invest-ment targets set by policy. For example, subsidies for RE technologiesfuelled a boom in solar panel manufacturing in China and allowedsolar production capacity to increase significantly. Combined with thedecrease in the price of silicon, the main component of traditionalsolar panels, this reduced the competitive advantage of US companies,many of which either went bankrupt or were purchased by Chinesecompanies (The New York Times, 2013). Also, in Spain, promisesof 10% annual returns boosted the solar industry in 2008, yet thesubsequent reduction of subsidies at different points in time increasedproducers’ reluctance to commit to future investments (The Economist,
∗ Corresponding author.E-mail addresses: lars.h.sendstad@ntnu.no (L.H. Sendstad), Michalis.Chronopoulos@city.ac.uk (M. Chronopoulos).
2013). However, recent tenders for RE with subsidies, have induced anew investment boom (REN21, 2018).Although the real options literature has grown considerably, modelsthat analyse the implications of policy uncertainty on investment de-cisions are often narrowly specified, in that technological uncertaintyis either ignored or not considered within the context of complexinvestment opportunities that involve embedded options (Yang et al.,2008; Boomsma and Linnerud, 2015; Ritzenhofen and Spinler, 2016;Zhang et al., 2016a). In turn, this implies that the value of the flexibilityto adopt improved technology versions may be critical in terms ofoffsetting the impact of policy uncertainty, yet it is currently over-looked. Therefore, in this paper we develop a real options framework toaddress the following research questions: i. How does economic, policyand technological uncertainty interact to affect sequential investmentdecisions? ii. Does the likely arrival of improved technology versionsincrease the value of a project and mitigate the reluctance to invest dueto policy uncertainty? and iii. Is the optimal investment policy undersequential investment significantly different than that under a lumpyinvestment strategy in the light of technological and policy uncertainty?These research questions are also motivated by Renewables 2018 globalstatus report:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2019.111152Received 27 March 2019; Received in revised form 24 November 2019; Accepted 26 November 2019
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‘‘. . . The interaction of policy, cost reductions and technology devel-opment has led to rapid change in the energy sector, prompting bothproactive and reactive responses from policy makers.’’ (REN21, 2018)
Hence, the contribution of this paper is threefold: i. we develop a realoptions framework for analysing how economic, technological and pol-icy uncertainty interact to affect sequential investment in successivelyimproved versions of a RE technology; ii. we show how an embeddedoption to adopt an improved technology version mitigates the impact ofsubsidy retraction on invest timing, by comparing a stepwise to a lumpyinvestment strategy; and iii. we derive insights on how policymakerscan devise more efficient policy mechanisms and incentivise investmentin RE technologies.We assume that the subsidy takes the form of a fixed premiumon top of the electricity price. Thus, it resembles a feed-in premium,which is one of the popular support schemes currently implemented invarious forms in many countries (IRENA, 2018a). We find that greaterlikelihood of subsidy retraction postpones investment, yet the likelyprovision of a subsidy raises the investment incentive. Interestingly,we also find that the option to invest sequentially in improved tech-nology versions raises the value of the investment opportunity, andmitigates the loss in project value due to subsidy retraction. Therefore,the implications of these new insights are important considering thatmany countries implement a variety of selective support schemes,without taking into account particular features of investment projectsor considering how cautiously private firms may act in the light of theuncertainties due to innovation and frequent switches between policyregimes. Consequently, this paper also offers a direction for furtherresearch on the appropriate model specification for capturing featuresof low-carbon investments, e.g. irreversibility, delay and embeddedoptions, that impinge upon the radical policy imperatives for structuralchange in electricity markets to meet ambitious sustainability targets.We proceed by discussing some related work in Section 2 and intro-duce assumptions and notation in Section 3. In Section 4.1, we addressthe problem of optimal investment timing taking into account onlyprice and technological uncertainty. We introduce policy uncertaintyin Sections 4.2 and 4.3 in the form of sudden retraction and provisionof a subsidy, and allow the sudden provision of a retractable subsidyin Section 4.4. Section 5 presents numerical results for each case via acase study on offshore wind, while Section 6 concludes the paper byoffering policy insights and directions for further research.
2. Related work
The seminal work of McDonald and Siegel (1985) and Dixit andPindyck (1994) has spawned a substantial literature in the area ofinvestment under uncertainty. A strand of this literature illustrates theamenability of real options theory to emerging technologies, researchand development (R&D) and the energy sector (Bastian-Pinto et al.,2010; Koussis et al., 2007; Rothwell, 2006; Siddiqui and Fleten, 2010;Lemoine, 2010; Farzan et al., 2015; Franklin, 2015). Nevertheless,analytical formulations of problems that address investment in emerg-ing technologies either tackle the impact of technological uncertaintyon investment timing ignoring the implications of policy uncertainty(Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza, 2003) or allow for policy uncertaintywithout taking into account the sequential nature of investment inemerging technologies (Boomsma et al., 2012; Adkins and Paxson,2016). However, since support schemes aim at facilitating the transitionof emerging technologies through the steep part of the learning curve,uncertainty over the provision or retraction of a subsidy should be con-sidered in combination with uncertainty over the arrival of innovationsthat these subsidies are designed to support.Allowing for policy uncertainty, Boomsma et al. (2012) developa real options model in order to investigate how different supportschemes, including fixed feed-in tariff (FIT), premium FIT and REcertificate trading, as well as changes of a support scheme via Markov
switching, impact investment behaviour. They find that the implica-tions of the uncertainty associated with each support scheme can becrucial for both the time of investment and the size of a project. How-ever, allowing changes in the level of a subsidy to follow a continuous-time stochastic process does not facilitate insights on the permanent ortemporary termination of a support scheme. In the same line of work,Kim and Lee (2012) present a stochastic model for the evaluation andoptimisation of FIT policies under different payoff structures. However,like Boomsma et al. (2012), their analysis overlooks the implicationsof technological uncertainty and how embedded options to adopt im-proved technology versions may impact investment behaviour underthe different payoff structures of the FIT scheme.A real options model for analysing how investors’ behaviour isaffected by different RE support schemes and the risk of their even-tual termination is presented in Boomsma and Linnerud (2015). Theirresults indicate that the prospect of subsidy retraction increases the rateof investment if it is applied to new projects, yet slows down investmentif it has a retroactive effect. In the same line of work, Chronopouloset al. (2016) allow for discretion over project scale under sequentialpolicy interventions and find that the likely retraction of a subsidymay facilitate investment, yet results in a smaller project. Also, theimplications of a FIT for RE investment is emphasised in Ritzenhofenand Spinler (2016), who show that under a sufficiently attractive FITregime, future regime changes have little impact on current investmentprojects, whereas under a free-market regime, in which investors areexposed to electricity price uncertainty, investment may be deferred oreven withdrawn.The importance of R&D investment for promoting the further de-velopment of solar power is emphasised in Zhang et al. (2016b), whodevelop a real options approach to assess the optimal levels of FITwithin the Chinese power market. However, the interaction betweentechnological and policy uncertainty is not taken into account. Also,an analysis of the implications of different kinds of subsidy supportfor investment timing and capacity sizing decisions is presented inWen et al. (2017). Their model also investigates whether it is possibleto align the firm’s investment decisions to the social optimal ones.Results indicate that when the subsidy support is introduced from thebeginning, it accelerates investment, and that, under a linear demandstructure, the firm’s investment decision and the social optimal decisioncannot be aligned. However, there is a conditional subsidy regulationthat aligns the firm’s investment decision to the social optimal deci-sion. Nevertheless, it remains unclear how embedded options to adoptimproved technology versions may impact the firms investment andcapacity sizing decisions, as well as the social welfare.While policy-oriented real options papers offer important insightson the impact of policy uncertainty on investment timing, they tendto ignore technological uncertainty and how sequential investmentopportunities may impact the optimal investment policy. In the areaof sequential investment under uncertainty, Majd and Pindyck (1987)show how traditional valuation methods understate the value of aproject by ignoring the flexibility embedded in the time to build. Inthe same line of work, Gollier et al. (2005) compare a sequence ofmodular nuclear power plants with a single nuclear power plant oflarge capacity. They find that the value of modularity may trigger in-vestment in the initial module at an electricity price level below the netpresent value (NPV) threshold. Allowing for technological uncertainty,Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015) develop a framework for sequentialtechnological adoption and analyse how economic and technologicaluncertainty impact the optimal technology adoption strategy and theassociated investment rule. They find that, although economic uncer-tainty postpones investment, uncertainty over the arrival of innovationsaccelerates technology adoption.Examples of early work that analyses the impact of technologicaluncertainty on the timing of technology adoption include Balcer andLippman (1984), who find that the optimal timing of technology adop-tion is influenced by expectations about future technological changes
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Fig. 1. State-transition diagram.
and that increasing technological uncertainty tends to delay adoption.Grenadier and Weiss (1997) develop a sequential investment model tostudy how the innovation rate and technological growth impact theoptimal technology adoption strategy, and find that a firm may adoptan available technology although more valuable innovations may occurin the future. Farzin et al. (1998) assume that technological innovationsfollow a Poisson process and find that the NPV rule can be used asan investment criterion in most cases. However, Doraszelski (2001)revisits the framework of Farzin et al. (1998) and shows that a firmwill always defer investment when it takes the value of waiting intoaccount. Also, a discrete-time model for maintenance and replacementof a technology is presented in Mehrez et al. (2000).We extend Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015) by introducing policyuncertainty in the form of sudden provision and retraction of a subsidy.Since technological uncertainty and increased intervention of govern-ment policy in trading arrangements may affect the optimal investmentpolicy of private firms, we explore their combined impact in this paper.We assume that the electricity price follows a geometric Brownianmotion (GBM) and that policy interventions and technological inno-vations follow independent Poisson processes. Thus, we confirm thatgreater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) lowers (raises) theinvestment incentive by decreasing (increasing) the expected value ofthe project. Also, we compare a stepwise to a lumpy investment strategyto show how an embedded option to adopt an improved technologyversion mitigates the impact of subsidy retraction on investment timing.Interestingly, we find that a stepwise investment strategy has a clearadvantage over lumpy investment, as it results in earlier technologyadoption. Additionally, we show how uncertainty over the arrival ofan innovation induces earlier investment, thus creating an opposingforce that further offsets the incentive to delay investment in the lightof subsidy retraction.
3. Assumptions and notation
We consider a price-taking firm with a perpetual option to invest in
𝑛 = 1, 2 successively improved versions of a RE technology, each withinfinite lifetime, facing price, technological and policy uncertainty.Given a probability space (𝛺, ,P), we assume that technological andpolicy uncertainty follow independent Poisson processes, {𝑀 𝑖𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0},where 𝑡 is continuous and denotes time, and 𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0 denotes the intensityof the Poisson process associated with technological innovations (𝑖 = 𝜏)or policy interventions (𝑖 = 𝑝). Intuitively, 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 counts the number ofrandom events that occur at times ℎ𝑖𝑚, 𝑚 ∈ N between 0 and 𝑡, and
𝑇 𝑖𝑚 = ℎ
𝑖
𝑚−ℎ
𝑖
𝑚−1 is the time interval between subsequent Poisson events.Also, we assume that there is no operating cost, that the electricity priceat time 𝑡, 𝐸𝑡, is independent of 𝑀 𝑖𝑡 (Boomsma and Linnerud, 2015), andthat only the second technology is subject to technological uncertainty,i.e. the first technology that the firm invests in is the currently availableversion.The electricity price follows a GBM (Boomsma et al., 2012), whichis described in (1). We denote by 𝜇 the annual growth rate, by 𝜎 the an-nual volatility, by 𝑑𝑍𝑡 the increment of the standard Brownian motion.
Also, we assume that the firm is risk-neutral and denote the risk-freerate by 𝜌. With respect to our motivating examples, although energyprices are mean reverting, empirical evidence based on 127 years ofdata indicates that the rate of mean reversion is low enough, and,therefore, assuming a GBM for investment analysis is unlikely to leadto large errors (Pindyck, 1999).
𝑑𝐸𝑡 = 𝜇𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑍𝑡, 𝐸0 ≡ 𝐸 > 0 (1)We denote the investment cost of technology 𝑛 by 𝐼𝑛 (𝐼2 > 𝐼1) andthe corresponding output by 𝐷𝑛 (𝐷2 ≥ 𝐷1). Note that 𝐷𝑛 is assumedto be fixed on the basis that for a specific technology annual averageproduction is unlikely to vary considerably. We let 𝑎 = 0, 1 denote thecurrent state of the subsidy in terms of being present (𝑎 = 1) or absent(𝑎 = 0), and assume that, in the future, the subsidy can be providedand retracted 𝑏 and 𝑐 times, respectively. We assume that the subsidytakes the form of a fixed premium, 𝑦, on top of the electricity price, 𝐸𝑡.Thus, the time of investment in technology 𝑛 is denoted by 𝜏𝑏,𝑐𝑛,𝑎 , while
𝜀𝑏,𝑐𝑛,𝑎 is the corresponding optimal investment threshold. For example,if the subsidy is currently unavailable (𝑎 = 0) but will be providedpermanently (𝑏 = 1 and 𝑐 = 0) at a random point in time in thefuture, then the optimal time to invest in the second technology is 𝜏1,02,0 ,while the corresponding optimal investment threshold is 𝜀1,02,0. Finally,
𝐹 𝑏,𝑐𝑛,𝑎 (⋅) is the maximised expected NPV from investing in technology 𝑛,while 𝛷𝑏,𝑐𝑛,𝑎 (⋅) is the expected value of the revenues of the active projectinclusive of embedded options.The firm’s different states of operation are indicated in Fig. 1, wherea transition due to a Poisson event (investment) is indicated by a dashed(solid) arrow. The value function and optimal investment threshold ineach state are determined via backward induction, which are describedbelow.
1. State 2: Initially, we assume that the firm operates technology2, which is adopted at time 𝜏𝑏,𝑐2,𝑎, and, thus, the firm holds thevalue function 𝛷𝑏,𝑐2,𝑎(𝐸).2. State (1,2): Next, we step back and assume that the firm holdsthe value function 𝐹 𝑏,𝑐2,𝑎 (𝐸), consisting of the value from operatingtechnology 1 and a single embedded option to invest in technol-ogy 2. The latter is exercised at time 𝜏𝑏,𝑐2,𝑎, at which point the firmobtains the value function 𝛷𝑏,𝑐2,𝑎(𝐸), which is already determinedin the previous step.3. State 1: Before the arrival of the second technology, the firmoperates technology 1 and holds an option to adopt technology2 that has yet to become available. The firm’s value functionis 𝛷𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎(𝐸) and consists of the expected value from operatingtechnology 1 and the embedded option to invest in technology2, which is not available yet.4. State (0,1): Finally, we assume that the firm is not active andwaits to adopt technology 1. Thus, before time 𝜏𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎 the firm holdsthe value function 𝐹 𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎 (𝐸), i.e. the option to invest in technology1 with a single embedded option to invest technology 2, that hasyet to become available.
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Note that at a given state, a policy intervention (loop arrows) changesthe value of 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝑐 via the recursive formulae 𝑎 ∶= 1−𝑎, 𝑏 ∶= 𝑏−1 and
𝑐 ∶= 𝑐−1. For example, in the case of provision of a retractable subsidywe initially have 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑐 = 1. Once the subsidy is provided,the updated value of 𝑎 is 𝑎 ∶= 1−0 = 1 and for 𝑏 is 𝑏 ∶= 1−1 = 0. Hence,until the second policy intervention, the new state is defined by 𝑎 = 1,
𝑏 = 0 and 𝑐 = 1. Finally, following the retraction of the subsidy, wehave 𝑎 ∶= 1 − 1 = 0, 𝑏 = 0, as there are not further subsidy provisions,and 𝑐 ∶= 1 − 1 = 0.
4. Model
4.1. Benchmark case: Investment without policy uncertainty
We assume that the firm has the option to invest in each technol-ogy facing only price and technological uncertainty. Using backwardinduction, we first assume that the firm is operating the first technologyholding the option to invest in the second one, that is already available,as indicated in (2). The first term on the right-hand side is the immedi-ate cash flows from operating the first technology and the second termis the expected value of the option in the continuation region.
𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) = 𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑎𝑦) 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒
−𝜌𝑑𝑡E𝐸
[
𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸)
] (2)
By expanding the right-hand side of (2) using Itô’s lemma, we obtainthe ordinary differential equation (ODE) (3), where  = 12𝜎2𝐸2 𝑑2𝑑𝐸2 +
𝜇𝐸 𝑑𝑑𝐸 denotes the differential generator.
( − 𝜌)𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) +𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑦𝑎) = 0 (3)The solution of (3) is indicated in (4). The first term on the top part of(4) reflects the expected present value of the revenues from operatingthe first technology and the second term represents the option to investin the second one, where 𝛽1 > 0 is the positive root of the quadratic
1
2𝜎
2𝛽(𝛽 − 1) + 𝜇𝛽 − 𝜌 = 0. Also, the bottom part of (4) reflects theexpected value from operating the second technology, i.e. 𝛷0,02,𝑎(𝐸) =
𝐷2𝐸
0,0
2,𝑎 (1+𝑎𝑦)
𝜌−𝜇 , reduced by the investment cost (all proofs can be found inthe appendix).
𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) =
{𝐷1𝐸(1+𝑎𝑦)
𝜌−𝜇 + 𝐴
0,0
2,𝑎𝐸
𝛽1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,𝑎
𝛷0,02,𝑎(𝐸) − 𝐼2 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,02,𝑎
(4)
The optimal investment threshold, 𝜀0,02,𝑎, and the endogenous constant,
𝐴0,02,𝑎, are obtained analytically by applying value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to the two branches of (4). These conditions areindicated in (A.2) and (A.3), respectively, and the expression for 𝜀0,02,𝑎and 𝐴0,02,𝑎 is indicated in (5).
𝜀0,02,𝑎 =
𝛽1
𝛽1 − 1
𝐼2 (𝜌 − 𝜇)(
𝐷2 −𝐷1
)
(1 + 𝑎𝑦)
and 𝐴0,02,𝑎 =
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 1𝜀0,02,𝑎
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 ⎛⎜⎜⎝
(
𝐷2 −𝐷1
)
(1 + 𝑎𝑦) 𝜀0,02,𝑎
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼2
⎞⎟⎟⎠ (5)Although we do not consider the choice between the two technologies(Décamps et al., 2006), the feasibility of a compulsive strategy relieson the ratios between output produced and investment cost of the twotechnologies, as indicated in Proposition 1. Intuitively, this relationshipreflects the assumption of the second technology being more advanced,in terms of producing greater output, yet also more costly than thefirst one. Formally, this trade-off is defined by the existence of 𝐸∗ > 0such that 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) ≥ 𝛷0,02,𝑎(𝐸) for 𝐸 ≤ 𝐸∗ and 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) < 𝛷0,02,𝑎(𝐸) for
𝐸 > 𝐸∗. Consequently, this definition implies that the NPV at the pointof intersection between the expected NPVs of the two technologies ispositive, and, therefore, both technologies present viable investmentopportunities for different electricity price ranges. Otherwise, if the
NPV at the point of intersection is negative then only the new technol-ogy presents a viable investment opportunity. This is also motivated byoffshore wind projects, where new projects have a substantially higheryield but at a greater cost (see Section 5).
Proposition 1. A trade-off between the two technologies exists if 𝐷1𝐼1 >
𝐷2
𝐼2
.
Next, we assume that the firm is in State 1, where it operates thefirst technology holding an embedded option to adopt the second one,which has yet to become available. We follow the approach of Dixitand Pindyck (1994, p. 202–205) to describe the dynamics of the valuefunction 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸), as in (6). The first term on the right-hand side of(6) is the immediate profit from operating the first technology. As thesecond term indicates, with probability 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡 the second technology willarrive and the firm will receive the value function 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸), whereas,with probability 1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡, no innovation will occur and the firm willcontinue to hold the value function 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸).
𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) = 𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑎𝑦) 𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑒−𝜌𝑑𝑡E𝐸
{
𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡𝐹
0,0
2,𝑎 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸) +
(
1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡
)
𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸)
} (6)
By expanding the right-hand side of (6) using Itô’s lemma, we obtainthe ordinary differential equation (7). Note that 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) is defined overtwo different intervals of 𝐸, i.e. 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,𝑎 and 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,02,𝑎. Consequently,(7) must be solved for each one of these two price intervals, separately.
( − 𝜌)𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) + 𝜆𝜏
[
𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) −𝛷
0,0
1,𝑎(𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑦𝑎) = 0 (7)
We solve (7) and obtain the expression for 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) that is indicated in(8), where 𝐴0,01,𝑎 ≤ 0 and 𝐵0,01,𝑎 ≥ 0 are determined analytically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the two branches of(8) and are given in (A.4) and (A.5). The terms 𝛿1 > 1, 𝛿2 < 0 are theroots of the quadratic 12𝜎2𝛿(𝛿 − 1) + 𝜇𝛿 − (𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏) = 0. The first term onthe top part of (8) represents the expected present value of the revenuesfrom operating the first technology, while the second term is the optionto invest in the second one, adjusted via the third term because thesecond technology has yet to become available. The first two termson the bottom part of (8) represent the expected profit from the twotechnologies. Notice that both the output and investment cost in thesecond technology are adjusted by 𝜆𝜏 , since the second technology isnot available yet. Similar formulations can be found in Huisman andKort (2004) and Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015). The third termreflects the likelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region priorto the arrival of an innovation. Note that if 𝜆𝜏 = 0, then the secondtechnology will never arrive and the firm will continue to operate thefirst technology indefinitely, which means that 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) = 𝐷1𝐸(1+𝑎𝑦)𝜌−𝜇 forall 𝐸 > 0. In contrast, 𝜆𝜏 → ∞ implies that the second technology willarrive within the next time interval, and, therefore, 𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) = 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸).
𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ 𝐴0,02,𝑎𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐴0,01,𝑎𝐸
𝛿1 ,
𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,𝑎(
𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1
)
𝐸 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
) − 𝜆𝜏𝐼2
𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏
+ 𝐵0,01,𝑎𝐸
𝛿2 ,
𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,02,𝑎
(8)
Finally, the value of the option to invest in State (0,1) is describedin (9), where 𝜀0,01,𝑎 and 𝐶0,01,𝑎 ≥ 0, are determined numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the two branches.The top part on the right-hand side of (9) is the value of the optionto invest in the first technology, while the bottom part reflects theexpected value of the active project, inclusive of the embedded optionto invest in the second one, reduced by the investment cost.
𝐹 0,01,𝑎 (𝐸) =
{
𝐶0,01,𝑎𝐸
𝛽1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,01,𝑎
𝛷0,01,𝑎(𝐸) − 𝐼1 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,01,𝑎 (9)
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4.2. Permanent subsidy retraction
We extend the previous framework by assuming that a subsidy isavailable and that it may be retracted permanently at a random pointin time, 𝑇 𝑝1 , i.e. 𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = 0 and 𝑐 = 1. Hence, the expected value ofthe revenues from operating the second technology is indicated in (10).The first term on the right-hand side is the expected present value ofthe revenues in the absence of the subsidy, while, the second term, isthe expected value of the subsidy, that has an exponential lifetime andwill be retracted at 𝑇 𝑝1 .
E𝐸
⎡⎢⎢⎣∫
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡 + ∫
𝑇 𝑝1
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑡
⎤⎥⎥⎦
=
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ E
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝐷2𝐸𝑦
[
1 − 𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
1
]
𝜌 − 𝜇
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (10)
Since 𝑇 𝑝1 ∼ exp(𝜆𝑝), by evaluating the expectation of this expressionwith respect to 𝑇 𝑝1 we obtain (11). Notice that the subsidy will neverbe retracted if 𝜆𝑝 = 0, whereas a greater 𝜆𝑝 raises the likelihood ofsubsidy retraction and lowers the expected NPV of the project.
𝛷0,12,1(𝐸) =
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ ∫
∞
0
𝜆𝑝𝑒
−𝜆𝑝𝑇
𝑝
1
𝐷2𝐸𝑦
[
1 − 𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
1
]
𝜌 − 𝜇
𝑑𝑇1
=
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷2𝐸𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
(11)
Next, we assume that the firm is in State(1,2), where it operates thefirst technology and holds a single embedded option to invest in thesecond one. The dynamics of the firm’s value function are described in(12), where the first term on the right-hand side reflects the immediateprofit from operating the first technology. As the second term indicates,the option to invest in the second technology will be exercised in thepermanent absence of a subsidy with probability 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡. By contrast, withprobability 1−𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡, no policy intervention will take place and the firmwill continue to hold the option to invest in the second technology inthe presence of a retractable subsidy.
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) = 𝐷1𝐸(1 + 𝑦)𝑑𝑡
+ 𝑒−𝜌𝑑𝑡E𝐸
{
𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡𝐹
0,0
2,0 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸) +
(
1 − 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡
)
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸)
} (12)
By expanding the right-hand side of (12) using Itô’s lemma, we obtain(13).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,02,0 (𝐸) − 𝐹
0,1
2,1 (𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸(1 + 𝑦) = 0 (13)
The solution of (13) is described in (14), where 𝜀0,12,1 and 𝐴0,12,1 ≥ 0 aredetermined via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, while
𝜂1 > 1, 𝜂2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic 12𝜎2𝜂(𝜂−1)+𝜇𝜂−(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝) = 0.The first two terms in the top part of (14) represent the expected valueof the revenues from operating the first technology, while the thirdterm is the option to invest in the second one in the absence of asubsidy, adjusted via the fourth term since the subsidy is currentlyavailable.
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌−𝜇 +
𝐷1𝐸𝑦
𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝
+ 𝐴0,02,0𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐴0,12,1𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,12,1
𝛷0,12,1(𝐸) − 𝐼2 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,12,1
(14)
Next, we step back to State 1, where an innovation has not takenplace yet, but may occur over the time interval 𝑑𝑡 with probability 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡.The dynamics of 𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) are described in (15), where the first termon the right-hand side represents the immediate profit from operatingthe first technology and the second term reflects the expected valuein the continuation region. If the subsidy is retracted with probability
𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡, then either an innovation will take place with probability 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡
and the firm will receive the value function 𝐹 0,02,0 (𝐸), or no innovationwill take place with probability 1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡 and the firm will continue tooperate the first technology in the absence of a subsidy. Similarly, if nopolicy intervention occurs with probability 1 − 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡, then the firm willeither receive the value function 𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) with probability 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡, or it willcontinue to hold the value function 𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) with probability 1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡.
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) = 𝐷1𝐸(1 + 𝑦)𝑑𝑡
+𝑒−𝜌𝑑𝑡E𝐸
{
𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡
[
𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡𝐹
0,0
2,0 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸) +
(
1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡
)
𝛷0,01,0(𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸)
]
+
(
1 − 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑡
) [
𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡𝐹
0,1
2,1 (𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸) +
(
1 − 𝜆𝜏𝑑𝑡
)
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸 + 𝑑𝐸)
]} (15)
By expanding the right-hand side of (15) using Itô’s lemma, we obtain(16).
( − 𝜌)𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝛷0,01,0(𝐸) −𝛷
0,1
1,1(𝐸)
]
+ 𝜆𝜏
[
𝐹 0,12,0 (𝐸) −𝛷
0,1
1,1(𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸(1 + 𝑦) = 0 (16)
The expression of 𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) is indicated in (17), where 𝐴0,11,1 ≤ 0 and
𝐵0,11,1 ≤ 0 are determined numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions, while 𝜃1 > 1, 𝜃2 < 0 are the roots of the quadratic
1
2𝜎
2𝜃(𝜃 − 1) + 𝜇𝜃 −
(
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
)
= 0. The first two terms in thetop part of (17) represent the expected revenues from operating thefirst technology, while the third term is the option to invest in thesecond one, adjusted via the fourth term due to policy uncertainty.The fifth term reflects the loss in option value due to the absence ofthe second technology, and is adjusted via the last term due to policyuncertainty. The first three terms in the bottom part of (17) representthe expected revenues from investing in the second technology, whilethe last two terms reflect the likelihood of the price dropping in thewaiting region before the arrival of the second technology, adjustedfor policy uncertainty.
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝐸𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 𝐴0,02,0𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐴0,12,1𝐸
𝜂1
+𝐴0,01,0𝐸
𝛿1 + 𝐴0,11,1𝐸
𝜃1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,12,1
𝜆𝜏𝐷2𝐸 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
) + [𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)𝐷1]𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) (
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
)
− 𝜆𝜏𝐼2𝜌+𝜆𝜏 + 𝐵
0,0
1,0𝐸
𝛿2 + 𝐵0,11,1𝐸
𝜃2 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,12,1 (17)
Next, we step back to State (0,1), and, following the same approachas in (12), the dynamics of the option to invest in the first technologyare described in (18).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,01,0 (𝐸) − 𝐹
0,1
1,1 (𝐸)
]
= 0 (18)
The expression of 𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) is indicated in (19), where 𝜀0,11,1 and 𝐶0,11,1 ≥
0 are obtained numerically via value-matching and smooth-pastingconditions. The first term in the top part of (19) is the option to investin the absence of a subsidy, adjusted via the second term, since thesubsidy is currently available. The bottom part represents the expectedvalue from operating the first technology inclusive of the embeddedoption to invest in the second one.
𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) =
{
𝐶0,01,0𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐶0,11,1𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,11,1
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) − 𝐼1 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀0,11,1 (19)Alternatively, to facilitate the analysis of how 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 impactthe optimal investment policy, 𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) can be expressed as in (20) for
𝐸 < 𝜀0,11,1 < 𝜀
0,1
2,1. The optimal investment threshold can be obtainednumerically by applying the first-order necessary condition (FONC) to(20) and equating the marginal benefit (MB) of delaying investment to
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the marginal cost (MC) as in (21).
𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) =
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀0,11,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 [
𝛷0,11,1
(
𝜀0,11,1
)
− 𝐼1 − 𝐶
0,1
1,1𝜀
0,1𝜂1
1,1
]
, 𝐸 < 𝜀0,11,1 (20)
The left-hand side of (21) reflects the MB of delaying investment andthe right-hand side is the MC. Formally, the MB (MC) consists ofterms that offer a positive (negative) contribution to 𝜕𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸)∕𝜕𝜀0,11,1.Specifically, the first two terms on the left-hand side of (21) consistof the stochastic discount factor multiplied by the incremental projectvalue created by waiting until the price is higher. These terms arepositive, decreasing functions of the electricity price, as waiting longerallows the project to start at a higher initial price, yet the rate atwhich this benefit accrues diminishes due to the effect of discounting.The third term represents the reduction in the MC of waiting due tosaved investment cost. Similarly, the first two terms on the right-handside reflect the discounted opportunity cost of forgone cash flows. Thefourth and third term on the left- and right-hand side, respectively,reflect the loss in option value, since the second technology is notavailable yet. Specifically, the fourth term on the left-hand side is theMB from postponing the loss in value, whereas the third term on theright-hand side is the MC from a potentially greater impact of the lossfrom waiting for a higher threshold price. The last two terms on theleft- and the right-hand side reflect the necessary adjustments due topolicy uncertainty.
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀0,11,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 [
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+
𝛽1𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
− 𝛽1𝐴
0,0
1,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛿1−1 − 𝛽1𝐴
0,1
1,1𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝜃1−1
+
[
𝛽1𝐶
0,1
1,1 + 𝜂1𝐴
0,1
2,1
]
𝜀0,11,1
𝜂1−1
]
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀0,11,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 [
𝛽1𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝛽1𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
− 𝛿1𝐴
0,0
1,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛿1−1 − 𝜃1𝐴
0,1
1,1𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝜃1−1
+
[
𝜂1𝐶
0,1
1,1 + 𝛽1𝐴
0,1
2,1
]
𝜀0,11,1
𝜂1−1
] (21)
As shown in Proposition 2, greater likelihood of subsidy retractionlowers the MC by more than the MB, thereby raising the incentiveto postpone investment. Intuitively, the incentive to invest early inorder to take advantage of the subsidy for a longer period is mitigatedcompletely by the rapid reduction in the value of the active projectdue to subsidy retraction. However, as shown in Chronopoulos andSiddiqui (2015), an increase in the innovation rate while holding 𝜆𝑝fixed lowers the optimal investment threshold. Hence, in relation to thesecond research question, the likely arrival of an improved technologyversion creates an opposing force that mitigates the impact of subsidyretraction on the incentive to invest. Despite this opposing force, ahigher likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimal investmentthreshold when 𝜆𝜏 is fixed.
Proposition 2. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimalinvestment threshold.
To emphasise the implications of a stepwise investment strategy,we also consider the alternative option of lumpy investment, where thefirm incurs the cost 𝐼1+𝐼2 in a single step to develop a project producingoutput of 𝐷2. Proposition 3 indicates that adopting a lumpy investmentstrategy results in later technology adoption compared to a stepwiseinvestment strategy. Consequently, with respect to the third researchquestion, the option to adopt an improved technology version alters theoptimal investment policy relative to the case of lumpy investment, byincreasing the incentive to invest earlier in an existing technology andexpand capacity at a later point once an innovation becomes available.
Proposition 3. Stepwise investment induces earlier technology adoptionthan a lumpy investment strategy as long as 𝐼1𝐼2 > 𝑦.
4.3. Provision of a permanent subsidy
Here, we assume that a subsidy will be provided permanently ata random point in time, i.e. 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1 and 𝑐 = 0. Hence, like inSection 4.2, we assume that there is a single policy intervention anddenote the random time at which it takes place by 𝑇 𝑝1 . The expectedpresent value of the revenues from operating the second technology isindicated in (22), and, according to the right-hand side, it consists ofthe expected value of the project in the absence of the subsidy (firstterm) and the extra value of the subsidy (second term) that will beprovided at time 𝑇 𝑝1 .
E𝐸
⎡⎢⎢⎣∫
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡 + ∫
∞
𝑇 𝑝1
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑡
⎤⎥⎥⎦ =
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+E
{
𝐷2𝐸𝑦𝑒
−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇 𝑝1
𝜌 − 𝜇
}
(22)
Since 𝑇 𝑝1 ∼ exp(𝜆𝑝), taking the expectation of this expression withrespect to 𝑇 𝑝1 yields (23).
𝛷1,02,0(𝐸) =
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝐷2𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(23)
Stepping back to State (1,2), the dynamics of the option to invest in thesecond technology are described in (24).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,02,1 (𝐸) − 𝐹
1,0
2,0 (𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸 = 0 (24)
The expression of 𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) is indicated in (25), where 𝜀1,02,0, 𝐴1,02,0 ≤ 0,
𝐵2,02,0 ≥ 0, and 𝐶1,02,0 ≥ 0, are determined numerically via value-matchingand smooth-pasting conditions between the three branches. Note that,unlike the case of sudden subsidy retraction, 𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) is now definedover three different regions of 𝐸: (i) if 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,1, then the firm wouldnot invest even in the presence of a subsidy, (ii) if 𝜀0,02,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,02,0, thenthe firm would invest immediately if the subsidy is provided, and (iii)if 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,02,0, then investment will take place immediately even in theabsence of the subsidy. Intuitively, compared to (14), the extra regionreflects the implications of subsidy provision in terms of the expectedincrease in the firm’s profits, and, in turn, the likelihood of investmentwhen the subsidy is not available but rather a future promise.
𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝑦𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) + 𝐴0,02,1𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐴1,02,0𝐸𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,1
𝜆𝑝𝐷2𝐸 (1 + 𝑦) + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) − 𝜆𝑝𝐼2
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 𝐵1,02,0𝐸
𝜂2 + 𝐶1,02,0𝐸
𝜂1 ,
𝜀0,02,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,02,0
𝛷1,02,0(𝐸) − 𝐼2, 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,02,0 (25)
The dynamics of the value of the active project before the arrival ofthe second technology in State 1 are described in (26).
( − 𝜌)𝛷1,01,0(𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝛷0,01,1(𝐸) −𝛷
1,0
1,0(𝐸)
]
+ 𝜆𝜏
[
𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) −𝛷
1,0
1,0(𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸 = 0 (26)
Notice that (26) must be solved separately for each of the expressionsof 𝐹 0,02,1 (𝐸), 𝛷0,01,1(𝐸), and 𝐹 1,02,0 (𝐸) that are indicated in (4), (8) and (25),respectively. Thus, 𝛷1,01,0(𝐸) is also defined over three different regionsof 𝐸. Following the same approach as in Section 4.2, we obtain the ex-pression for 𝛷1,01,0(𝐸) that is described in (27), where 𝐴1,01,0, 𝐵1,01,0 , 𝐶1,01,0 and
𝐷1,01,0 are determined via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditionsbetween the three branches. Each branch reflects the expected value ofthe first technology with an embedded option to invest in the secondone. The second technology is not available yet and the correspondinginvestment option will not be exercised if the electricity price is low,i.e. 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,1 (top branch), however, it will be exercised instantly if the
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subsidy is provided (middle branch) or immediately regardless of thesubsidy (bottom branch).
𝛷1,01,0(𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸𝑦
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)
+𝐴0,02,1𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐴1,02,0𝐸
𝜂1 + 𝐴0,01,1𝐸
𝛿1 + 𝐴1,01,0𝐸
𝜃1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,02,1[[
𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1
]
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
+
𝜆𝜏𝐷2
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
]
×
𝜆𝑝𝐸 (1 + 𝑦)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)2
(
1 + 𝜆𝑝+𝜆𝜏𝜌−𝜇
) + 𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−
(
1
𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏
+ 1
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
) 𝜆𝜏𝜆𝑝𝐼2
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
+𝐵1,02,0𝐸
𝜂2 + 𝐶1,02,0𝐸
𝜂1 + 𝐵0,01,1𝐸
𝛿2
+𝐵1,01,0𝐸
𝜃2 + 𝐶1,01,0𝐸
𝜃1 , 𝜀0,02,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,02,0[ 𝜆𝑝 (1 + 𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
+
𝜆𝑝𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 1
]
𝜆𝜏𝐷2𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)2
(
1 + 𝜆𝑝+𝜆𝜏𝜌−𝜇
)
+
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
𝜆𝑝𝑦
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
1 + 𝜆𝑝+𝜆𝜏𝜌−𝜇
) + 1⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
×
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
−
𝜆𝜏𝐼2
𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏
+ 𝐵0,01,1𝐸
𝛿2 +𝐷1,01,0𝐸
𝜃2 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,02,0
(27)
Like in (26), the dynamics of the option to invest in the firsttechnology with a single embedded option to upgrade to the secondone are described in (28).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 1,01,0 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) − 𝐹
1,0
1,0 (𝐸)
]
= 0 (28)
The expression of 𝐹 1,01,0 (𝐸) is indicated in (29), where 𝜀1,01,0, 𝐺1,01,0, 𝐻1,01,0 ,and 𝐽 1,01,0 , are determined numerically via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the three branches. The first term in the topbranch of (29) reflects the value of the option to invest in the presenceof a subsidy, adjusted via the second term due to policy uncertainty.The first two terms in the second branch represent the expected valueof the project if the subsidy is provided, while the third term is theoption to invest in the second technology, adjusted for technologicaluncertainty via the fourth term. The last two terms reflect the likelihoodof the price either dropping below 𝜀0,01,1 or increasing beyond 𝜀1,01,0.
𝐹 1,01,0 (𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐶0,01,1𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐺1,01,0𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,01,1
𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑦)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) − 𝜆𝑝𝐼1
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 𝐴0,02,1𝐸
𝛽1
+
𝜆𝑝
𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝜏
𝐴0,01,1𝐸
𝛿1 +𝐻1,01,0𝐸
𝜂2 + 𝐽 1,01,0𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝜀0,01,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,01,0
𝛷1,01,0(𝐸) − 𝐼1 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,01,0 (29)
Although it is not possible to express the value of the option toinvest as in (20), we analyse the impact of 𝜆𝑝 on 𝜀1,01,0 by applyingthe FONC to the value-matching condition between the bottom twobranches of (29), and, thus, obtain (30). The first term on the left-handside represents the extra benefit from allowing the project to start ata higher threshold price, the second term reflects the reduction in theMC due to saved investment cost and the third term is the MB frombeing able to delay investment should the electricity price drop below
𝜀0,01,1. The first term on the right-hand side is the MC of the forgone cashflows, while the second term represents the MC associated with theabsence of the second technology. The fourth term on the left-hand sidereflects the increase in MB due to the likelihood of a subsidy, whereas
the third term on the right-hand is the corresponding MC of waitingbecause the subsidy is not available yet.⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀1,01,0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜂1 [
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+
𝜂1𝜌𝐼1(
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
)
𝜀1,01,0
+𝜃1𝐴
1,0
1,0𝜀
1,0
1,0
𝜃1−1 +
(
𝜂1 − 𝜂2
)
𝐻1,01,0 𝜀
1,0
1,0
𝜂2−1
]
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀1,01,0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜂1 [
𝜂1𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−
(
𝛿1 − 𝜂1
)
𝜆𝜏
𝜆𝜏 − 𝜆𝑝
𝐴0,01,1𝜀
1,0
1,0
𝛿1−1 + 𝜂1𝐴
1,0
1,0𝜀
1,0
1,0
𝜃1−1
] (30)
As shown in Proposition 4, greater likelihood of subsidy provisionlowers the MB by more than the MC, thereby decreasing the optimalinvestment threshold. In combination with technological uncertainty,this result further emphasises how the optimal investment policy un-der stepwise investment differs from that under lumpy investment.Indeed, holding 𝜆𝑝 fixed, an increase in 𝜆𝜏 raises the investment in-centive, i.e. reduces the investment threshold, thus making the impactof subsidy provision even more pronounced.
Proposition 4. Greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowers the optimalinvestment threshold.
The relative loss in option value due to subsidy provision (𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 =
1, 𝑐 = 0) or retraction (𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = 0, 𝑐 = 1) is 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)−𝐹 𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎 (𝐸)
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)
. For example,under sudden subsidy provision, 𝜆𝑝 = 0 means that the subsidy willnever be provided and the relative loss in option value is maximised.By contrast, a greater 𝜆𝑝 increases the likelihood of permanent subsidyprovision and lowers the relative loss in option value. The range ofpossible value for the relative loss in option value is indicated inProposition 5.
Proposition 5. 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)−𝐹 𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎 (𝐸)
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)
∈
[
0, 1 − 1
(1+𝑦)𝛽1
].
4.4. Provision of a retractable subsidy
Unlike Section 4.3, here, we assume that the subsidy that wasprovided at time 𝑇 𝑝1 may be retracted at time 𝑇 𝑝2 , i.e. 𝑎 = 0, 𝑏 = 1 and
𝑐 = 1. Consequently, once the subsidy is provided, the firm receivesthe value of a retractable subsidy, which is already described in (11).The expected value of the project can be calculated as indicated in (31).Unlike (22), the second term on the left-hand side of (31) indicates thatthe subsidy is only available until time 𝑇 𝑝2 . Using the properties of theErlang distribution for the joint density of 𝑇 𝑝1 and 𝑇 𝑝2 , we can expressthe expected value of the active project as in (31).
E𝐸
⎡⎢⎢⎣∫
∞
0
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑡 + ∫
𝑇 𝑝2
𝑇 𝑝1
𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝐷2𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑑𝑡
⎤⎥⎥⎦
=
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ E
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝐷2𝐸𝑦
[
𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
1 − 𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
2
]
𝜌 − 𝜇
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭
=
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷2𝐸𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇
[
∫
∞
0
𝜆𝑝𝑒
−𝜆𝑝𝑇
𝑝
1 𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
1 𝑑𝑇 𝑝1
−∫
∞
0
𝜆2𝑝𝑇
𝑝
2 𝑒
−𝜆𝑝𝑇
𝑝
2 𝑒−(𝜌−𝜇)𝑇
𝑝
2 𝑑𝑇 𝑝2
] (31)
The analytical expression of (31) is indicated in (32). Unlike Sec-tion 4.3, the subsidy is now available for a smaller time period, and,thus, its expected value is reduced, since 𝜆𝑝(
𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝
)2 ≤ 𝜆𝑝(𝜌−𝜇)(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝) .
𝛷1,12,0(𝐸) =
𝐷2𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝐷2𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 (32)
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Next, in State (1,2), the firm operates the first technology andholds a single embedded investment option. The dynamics of the valuefunction 𝐹 1,12,0 (𝐸) are described in (33), which must be solved for eachexpression of 𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸), that is indicated in (14). The expression for
𝐹 1,12,0 (𝐸) is indicated in (D.1).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 1,12,0 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) − 𝐹
1,1
2,0 (𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸 = 0 (33)
Stepping back to State 1, the dynamics of the value function 𝛷1,11,0(𝐸) areindicated in (34), and the expression of 𝛷1,11,0(𝐸) is indicated in (D.2).
( − 𝜌)𝛷1,11,0(𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) −𝛷
1,1
1,0(𝐸)
]
+ 𝜆𝜏
[
𝐹 1,12,0 (𝐸) −𝛷
1,1
1,0(𝐸)
]
+𝐷1𝐸 = 0 (34)Finally, in State (0,1), the dynamics of the value of the option to investin the first technology are described in (35). Solving (35) for eachexpression of 𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) indicated in (19), we obtain (D.3).
( − 𝜌)𝐹 1,11,0 (𝐸) + 𝜆𝑝
[
𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸) − 𝐹
1,1
1,0 (𝐸)
]
= 0 (35)
As it will be shown numerically, the likely retraction of the subsidylowers the investment incentive compared to the case of permanentsubsidy provision. This happens because the reduction in the lifetimeof the subsidy renders it less valuable and raises the incentive to delayinvestment.
5. Case study
We illustrate the impact of price, policy and technological uncer-tainty on the optimal investment policy via a case study on offshorewind, which has experienced a tremendous growth over the last twentyyears. Particularly impressive is the output increase over this timeperiod, which is mostly driven by greater hub-heights, sweep areaand average capacity. These factors have increased the capital costof such projects considerably. Indeed, a typical offshore-wind turbinehas a capacity of 4 MW today compared to only 2 MW in 2000. Also,the capacity factor, i.e. the average electricity generated divided bythe capacity, has increased from 30% twenty years ago to 42% today(IRENA, 2018b). Hence, we can expect a typical offshore-wind turbineto yield 14.5 GWh per year today (4 MW×0.42 × 24h×365d) comparedto 10 GWh in 2000. According to IRENA (2018b), the total cost ofan offshore-wind turbine is approximately 4000 EUR/kW, and, witha capacity of 4 MW, the total installation cost is 16 million EUR,while less advanced platforms cost around 5.4 million EUR for a 2 MWcapacity.The relevant parameter values are indicated in Table 1. Apart from
𝐼𝑛 and 𝐷𝑛 that are obtained from IRENA (2018b), the remaining param-eter values are based on stylised assumptions. However, 𝜇 and 𝜎 canbe estimated from historic electricity prices, 𝑟 can be estimated fromgovernment bonds and 𝜆𝜏 can be estimated by fitting a Poisson processto historical data on innovation (https://ens.dk/en). Also, informationon historic policy changes that can be used to gauge policymakers’commitment to current subsidies can be found at www.res-legal.eu/.The support scheme we consider is akin to a premium FIT, i.e. a fixedproportion on top of the electricity price (Couture et al., 2010). [Forexample, under the FIT scheme in Germany the subsidy has been set to15 EUR/MWh],1 and since market prices were around 50 EUR/MWh inearly 2019, the subsidy amounts to 30% of the electricity price.2 Also,we consider a context where rapid technological innovation rendersexisting technologies obsolete so that only a new technology presentsa viable investment opportunity after the first one has already beenadopted.
1 A detailed description of the subsidy scheme in Germany can befound in http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/germany/single/s/res-e/t/promotion/aid/premium-tariff-i-market-premium/lastp/135/.2 Market prices are available at https://www.epexspot.com/en/market-data/elix.
Table 1Parameter values.Parameter Description Benchmark values
𝐷2 Output for technology 2 14.5 GWh per year
𝐼2 Investment cost for technology 2 16 mEUR
𝐷1 Output for technology 1 5 GWh per year
𝐼1 Investment cost for technology 1 5 mEUR
𝑦 Subsidy level 30%
𝑟 Risk-free rate 2%
𝜇 Electricity price growth parameter 0%
𝜎 Volatility electricity price 20%
𝜆𝑝 Policy uncertainty 𝜆𝑝 ∈ [0, 1]
𝜆𝜏 Technological uncertainty 𝜆𝜏 ∈ [0, 1]
Fig. 2 illustrates the project and option value as well as the optimalinvestment threshold for the second technology in the case of perma-nent subsidy retraction (left panel) and permanent subsidy provision(right panel). As the left panel illustrates, greater likelihood of subsidyretraction lowers the expected value of both the investment opportunityand the active project. This increases the incentive to delay investmentand raises the optimal investment threshold. However, greater likeli-hood of subsidy provision raises the expected value of the option toinvest and lowers the optimal investment threshold.Fig. 3 illustrates the impact of technological and policy uncertaintyon the optimal investment threshold in the second (left panel) and thefirst technology (right panel) under sudden subsidy retraction. As bothpanels illustrate, greater price uncertainty raises the opportunity cost ofinvestment, and, in turn, the value of waiting, thereby increasing theincentive to postpone investment. Also, the threat of permanent subsidyretraction decreases the firm’s incentive to invest and raises the optimalinvestment threshold, as shown in Proposition 2. However, the rightpanel illustrates the interaction between economic, technological andpolicy uncertainty, and indicates that stepwise investment facilitatesearlier technology adoption compared to lumpy investment and that anincrease in 𝜆𝜏 makes this result even more pronounced. Intuitively, as
𝜆𝜏 increases, the time interval between subsequent technology versionsdecreases. Consequently, in the attempt to maintain a compulsivestrategy, a firm would be more willing to adopt the current technologyversion sooner before the new technology version is released. Further-more, when the second technology is uncertain, i.e. for 0 < 𝜆𝜏 <∞, anearlier adoption of the first technology facilitates the arrival of the sec-ond one. Hence, the firm has an incentive to adopt the first technologyearlier to increase the expected NPV of the second one. From a technicalstandpoint, an increase in 𝜆𝜏 while holding 𝜆𝑝 fixed raises the value ofthe embedded option, and, in turn, the incentive to invest. However, fora given 𝜆𝑝, the impact of 𝜆𝜏 on the optimal investment threshold in thefirst technology is not monotonic. This happens because in the presenceof the embedded option (𝜆𝜏 →∞) the project and option value for thefirst technology are greater compared to the case 𝜆𝜏 = 0, yet the optimalinvestment threshold is not affected. This implies that, the firm behavesmyopically when adopting the first technology given that the secondone is available, as shown in Chronopoulos and Siddiqui (2015). Thisis why we observe the non-monotonic behaviour, whereby the optimalinvestment threshold decreases (increases) with higher 𝜆𝜏 when 𝜆𝜏 issmall (large).This result emphasises how modular capacity expansion in thelight of technological uncertainty can have a critical impact on thedecision to invest compared to a lumpy investment strategy and hasimportant implications for both private firms and policymakers. Indeed,the former can take into account the impact of policy uncertainty onthe value of the project and the option to invest, and, thus, makemore informed investment and operational decisions. Similarly, thelatter can devise more effective policy mechanisms by balancing theadverse impact of subsidy retraction on investment timing in terms ofdecelerating investment against the value of stepwise investment thatinduces earlier technology adoption. Note that the value of stepwise
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Fig. 2. Option and project value for investment in the second technology under permanent subsidy retraction (left) and permanent subsidy provision (right) for 𝜆𝑝 = 0.00, 0.2 and
𝜎 = 0.20. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) lowers (raises) the expected value of the project and decreases (increases) the investment incentive.
Fig. 3. Impact of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology (right) under sudden subsidy retraction. A higher innovation rateraises the value of the project and the incentive to invest, thereby mitigating the impact of subsidy retraction.
investment in terms of the timing of technology adoption is two-fold:First, stepwise investment facilitates earlier technology adoption as itentails an initial investment cost that is lower than that under lumpyinvestment. Second, greater likelihood of technological innovation low-ers the optimal investment threshold for the first technology for a givenlevel of 𝜆𝑝, thus further increasing the discrepancy between the lumpyand the stepwise investment investment threshold.The practical relevance of the results of Fig. 3 is also indicated inTable 2. Notice that an increase in 𝜆𝑝 for 𝜆𝜏 = 0 increases the incentiveto delay investment and raises the optimal investment threshold. Forexample, an increase of 𝜆𝑝 from 0 to 0.12 when 𝜆𝜏 = 0 raises 𝜀0,10,1from 43.5 to 49.67. However, an increase in 𝜆𝜏 from 0 to 0.0181 for
𝜆𝑝 = 0.12 results in a decrease in 𝜀0,10,1 to its initial value, i.e. 43.5. Hence,the implications of subsidy retraction in terms of delaying investmentcan be completely offset by incentivising greater R&D efforts. Theimplications of this result are relevant from a policymaking perspectiveconsidering how private firms often own a portfolio of technologieswith different innovation rates, e.g. wind, solar, etc. Hence, quantifying
the extent to which sequential investment opportunities acceleratetechnology adoption enables the design of policy commitments, so thatthe delay in technology adoption that policy uncertainty motivates isoffset by the greater incentive to invest due to the likely arrival of animproved technology version. Also, from a policymaking standpoint,the comparison between lumpy and stepwise investment is critical interms of balancing the benefit of installing a greater capacity at a laterdate (lumpy investment) over an earlier investment but in a smallerinitial project (stepwise investment).Unlike the case of sudden subsidy retraction, the left panel of Fig. 4indicates that greater likelihood of subsidy provision accelerates theadoption of the second technology, as shown in Proposition 4. As theright panel illustrates, this result also holds for the first technology,however, the interaction between policy and technological uncertaintyis such that greater likelihood of innovation further accelerates invest-ment in the first technology. Note that under a compulsive technologyadoption strategy the firm invests in each technology that becomesavailable. Thus, an increase in 𝜆𝜏 raises the value of the embedded
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Fig. 4. Impact of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology (right) under sudden subsidy provision. The likely arrival of a newtechnology raises the incentive to invest in the existing one and makes the impact of subsidy provision more pronounced.
Fig. 5. Impact of 𝜆𝑝 on the MB and MC of delaying investment for a permanent sudden retraction (left) and a permanent provision (right) for 𝜆𝜏 = 0.02 and 𝜎 = 0.20.
Table 2Comparison between lumpy and stepwise investment.Impact of 𝜆𝑝 on investment threshold Reduction in 𝜀0,10,1 due to innovation
𝜆𝑝 𝜆𝜏 Lumpyinvestment 𝜀0,10,1 𝜆𝑝 𝜆𝜏 𝜀0,10,1
0.00 0.0 64.95 43.50 0.00 – –0.12 – 73.86 49.67 0.12 0.0181 43.500.24 – 76.16 51.19 0.24 0.0012 49.670.36 – 77.37 51.99 0.36 0.0006 51.190.48 – 78.16 52.51 0.48 0.0004 51.990.60 – 78.72 52.87 0.60 0.0002 52.51
option to invest in the second technology, and, in turn, the value ofthe option to invest in the first one.Fig. 5 illustrates how the impact of policy uncertainty on the optimalinvestment threshold can be decomposed with respect to the MB andMC of delaying investment. Notice that greater likelihood of subsidyretraction (left panel) lowers both the MB and the MC curve, yet the
latter shifts down by more than the former, and, as a result, the twocurves intersect at a higher threshold. Intuitively, the extra cost fromdelaying investment is reflected partly in the loss in value due to theabsence of the second technology. This loss becomes more pronouncedas both the electricity price and the likelihood of subsidy retractionincrease. By contrast, greater likelihood of subsidy provision decreasesboth the MB and MC, yet the MB decreases by more, thereby decreasingthe marginal value of delaying investment, and, in turn, the optimalinvestment threshold (right panel).As shown in Proposition 5 and illustrated in Fig. 6, the relative lossin option value due to sudden subsidy retraction or provision obtainsvalues within the interval [0, 1 − 1
(1+𝑦)𝛽1
], which, for the parametervalue of Table 1, becomes [0, 35%]. Within this interval, an increasein the likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) from 𝜆𝑝 = 2% to
𝜆𝑝 = 4% raises (lowers) the relative loss in options value, as illustratedin the left (right) panel of Fig. 6 via the upward (downward) shiftof the curves. Also, as both panels illustrate, the impact of 𝜆𝜏 on therelative loss in option value is non-monotonic. Note that both 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)and 𝐹 1,01,1 (𝐸) reflect options to invest in an existing technology with
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Fig. 6. Impact of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 on the relative loss in options value under permanent subsidy retraction (left) and permanent subsidy provision (right), for 𝜎 = 0.20. The likely arrivalof a more advanced technology version raises (lowers) the relative loss in option value due to subsidy retraction (provision).
a single embedded option to adopt an improved technology version.Hence, as 𝜆𝜏 increases, the value of the embedded option increasesin both cases. However, since 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) includes a permanent subsidy,it increases proportionally by more than 𝐹 1,01,1 (𝐸), which explains theincrease in the relative loss in option value for low value of 𝜆𝜏 . Thisincrease stops as soon as 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) approaches its maximum value. Atthe same time, 𝐹 1,01,1 (𝐸) continues to increase yet at a lower rate, whichresults in a slight decrease in the relative loss in option value until italso reached its maximum and the relative loss remains constant.Fig. 7 illustrates how the likely retraction of a subsidy followingits initial provision impacts the optimal investment policy and therelative loss in option value. Compared to the case of permanentsubsidy provision (thin curves), the retraction of the subsidy lowers theexpected value of the project, and, in turn, the expected value of theinvestment opportunity, thereby increasing the incentive to postponeinvestment. This is in line with Karneyeva and Wüstenhagen (2017),who find that retroactive policy changes in Italy increased perceivedpolicy risk, and, in turn, the value of the remaining feed-in tariffs. Inthe right panel, the arrows indicate the direction of increasing policyinterventions, specifically, the shift from permanent provision of asubsidy to provision of a retractable subsidy. Notice that, for each valueof 𝜆𝑝, the relative loss in option value under the sudden provision ofa retractable subsidy (thick curves) is greater than the relative loss inoption value in the case of sudden provision of a permanent subsidy(thin curves). Thus, the right panel illustrates the adverse impact ofsequential policy interventions in terms of reducing the expected valueof the firm’s option to invest.Fig. 8 illustrates the impact of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 on the optimal investmentthreshold in the case of provision of a permanent and a retractablesubsidy. As both panels illustrate, 𝜆𝑝 = 0 implies that the subsidy willnever be provided, and, therefore, 𝜀1,12,0 = 𝜀1,02,0. However, an increase in
𝜆𝑝 implies that the value due the provision of the subsidy is reduced dueto the likelihood of a subsequent retraction. Consequently, relative tothe case of permanent subsidy provision, the likelihood that the subsidywill be available temporarily decreases the investment incentive andraises the optimal investment threshold, i.e. 𝜖1,12,0 > 𝜖1,02,0 . This also impliesthat the impact of 𝜆𝑝 on the optimal investment threshold is non-monotonic when the subsidy is only temporarily available. Indeed,for low values of 𝜆𝑝, 𝜖1,12,0 decreases due to the likely provision ofthe subsidy. However, a further increase in 𝜆𝑝 shortens the period inwhich the subsidy is available, thus increasing the incentive to postpone
investment. Furthermore, note that despite the likely withdrawal of asubsidy, the mere prospect of subsidy provision induces earlier adop-tion than no subsidy at all, as can be seen by comparing the surfaceto the line when 𝜆𝑝 = 0. Interestingly, even though the subsidy isassumed to be available under lumpy investment, a stepwise investmentapproach leads to earlier technology adoption despite the uncertaintyover subsidy provision. This happens because the expected value of theinvestment cost associated with the second technology is lower relativeto case of lumpy investment due to the effect of discounting.Nevertheless, as the right panel illustrates, the possibility to upgradean existing technology by adopting a more advanced version createsan opposing force that mitigates the impact of subsidy retraction. Inrelation to the interaction between technological and policy uncer-tainty, this result is crucial from the perspective of policymakers andprivate firms. Indeed, within a volatile economic environment, supportschemes that aim to stimulate investment in RE technologies are likelyto be revised frequently. Hence, taking into account how private firmsmay respond to frequent revisions of a support scheme when a projectentails embedded investment options, will facilitate informed revisionsof support schemes and decisions upon the rate of policy interventionsthat do not risk the timing of the required investments in RE andmaintain it within desired limits.
6. Conclusions and policy implications
The implications of the structural transformation of the power sectorfor both market participants and policymakers are considered to becrucial as they are expected to change substantially the wholesalemarket dynamics (Sensfuß et al., 2008). Within this environment,private firms are required to make accurate investment decisions, whilepolicymakers must take into account how private firms respond todifferent sources of uncertainty in order to incentivise investment. Theobjective of the analysis is to provide complementary insights to thewell-established energy systems models by addressing the behaviouralimpact of incentives upon market agents. These insights are particularlyrelevant to the energy sector, where frequent revisions of supportschemes create uncertain responses to incentives, while technologicalinnovations create sequential investment opportunities. The results ofthe analysis can be summarised into the following three main lessons:
i. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction (provision) postpones (ac-celerates) investment. The implications of this result are crucial
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Fig. 7. Option and project value for investment in the second technology under the provision of a permanent and a retractable subsidy for 𝜆𝑝 = 0.2 and 𝜎 = 0.2 (left) and relativeloss in option value (right). The likely retraction of a subsidy following its initial provision increases the incentive to postpone investment (left) and raises the relative loss inoption value (right).
Fig. 8. Impact of 𝜆𝑝 and 𝜆𝜏 on the optimal investment threshold in the second (left) and the first technology version (right) under sudden provision of a permanent and aretractable subsidy, for 𝜎 = 0.22. The likely retraction of a subsidy following its initial provision decreases the expected value of the project and increases the incentive to postponeinvestment. However, the option to adopt an improved technology version mitigates the impact of subsidy retraction.
from a policy-making standpoint as it quantifies how marketparticipants would act upon their flexibility to delay investmentin the light of economic, technological and policy uncertainty. In-deed, discretion over investment timing impacts upon the possibleeffectiveness of achieving timely the investment targets set by pol-icy. For example, under the Paris Agreement, the EU’s nationallydetermined contribution is to reduce greenhouse gas emissionsby at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 (The Independent,2018a).ii. The flexibility to proceed in stages enables efficient technologicalrisk management, which offers a critical advantage over a lumpyinvestment strategy as it accelerates investment, and this result ismore pronounced in the light of technological uncertainty. Thisimplies that the possibility to invest in an improved version ofa RE technology mitigates the impact of policy uncertainty inthe case of subsidy retraction, and makes the impact of subsidy
provision more pronounced. Consequently, the decision to pro-vide or retract a subsidy should account for the added valueof the flexibility to upgrade an existing RE technology and therate at which it will become available to ensure the efficientuse of scarce resources. Indeed, through new auction-based sys-tems, governments have almost eliminated subsidy payments foroffshore-wind, which has demonstrated tremendous efficiencyimprovements (IEA, 2017).iii. Sequential policy interventions should be designed so as to min-imise the likelihood of an adverse impact on the optimal timingof technology adoption. For example, the retraction of a subsidyfollowing its initial provision results in later technology adoptionrelative to the case of permanent subsidy provision. Quantifyingthe delay caused by the retraction of a subsidy makes it possibleto design its duration in a way that maintains the timing of tech-nology adoption within acceptable limits. This may also preventundesirable market reactions, such as the 56% decrease in RE
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investment after the announcement of RE subsidy cuts in the UK(The Independent, 2018b).
Extensions of this framework may include the development of atwo-factor model in order to investigate how the correlation betweenprice and policy uncertainty impacts the optimal investment policy.Additionally, empirical research regarding the rate of policy interven-tions would provide crucial insights not only on the appropriate modelspecification, but also on how to configure model parameters in orderto model realistic situations within the RE industry. Finally, to relax theassumption of a GBM, a mean-reverting process could be implementedwithin the same framework, while allowing for different technologyadoption strategies, e.g. leapfrog and laggard, would enable furtherinvestigation of how the dominant strategy is affected by technologicaland policy uncertainty.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared toinfluence the work reported in this paper.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Lars Hegnes Sendstad: Methodology, Formal analysis, Writing -original draft, Visualization. Michail Chronopoulos: Conceptualiza-tion, Validation, Writing - review & editing, Supervision.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful for helpful suggestions from Petter Bjerk-sund, Stein-Erik Fleten, Verena Hagspiel, Peter Kort and Frode Kjær-land. Additionally, we would like to express our gratitude for feedbackfrom participants of the Annual International Real Options Conference2015, InvestExl’s project meeting, FIBE 2016 and NFB Research SchoolConference 2015. We also acknowledge support from the ResearchCouncil of Norway through project 268093 and 274569.
Appendix A. Benchmark Case
The dynamics of the value function 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) are described in (2). Andby using Itô’s lemma, we expand the right-hand side of (2), and, thus,we obtain (A.1).
1
2
𝜎2𝐸2𝐹 0,0
′′
2,𝑎 (𝐸) + 𝜇𝐸𝐹
0,0′
2,𝑎 (𝐸) − 𝜌𝐹
0,0
2,𝑎 (𝐸) +𝐷1𝐸 (1 + 𝑦𝑎) = 0 (A.1)
Notice that the solution of the homogeneous part of (A.1) is 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) =
𝐴0,02,𝑎𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐵0,02,𝑎𝐸
𝛽2 . However, 𝐸 → 0 ⇒ 𝐵0,02,𝑎𝐸𝛽2 → ∞, and, therefore,
𝐵0,02,𝑎 = 0. The expression for 𝐹 0,02,𝑎 (𝐸) is indicated in (4). Also, 𝜀0,02,𝑎 and
𝐴0,02,𝑎 are indicated in (5) and are determined analytically via the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions indicated in (A.2) and (A.3),respectively.
𝐷2𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼2 =
𝐷1𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎(1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ 𝐴0,02,𝑎𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎
𝛽1 (A.2)
𝐷2 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
=
𝐷1(1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
+ 𝛽1𝐴
0,0
2,𝑎𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎
𝛽1−1 (A.3)
Also, the endogenous constants 𝐴0,01,𝑎 and 𝐵0,01,𝑎 are indicated in (A.4)and (A.5) and are determined by applying value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to (8). Note that 𝐴0,01,𝑎 ≤ 0, since the third termin the top part of (8) reflects the reduction in option value (secondterm) because the second technology has yet to become available. Also,
𝐵0,01,𝑎 ≥ 0 since the third term in the bottom part of (8) reflects thelikelihood of the price dropping in the waiting region.
𝐴0,01,𝑎 =
𝜀0,02,𝑎
−𝛿1
𝛿2 − 𝛿1
⎡⎢⎢⎣
𝜆𝜏
(
𝛿2 − 1
) (
𝐷2 −𝐷1
)
(1 + 𝑦𝑎) 𝜀0,02,𝑎
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
)
−
𝛿2𝜆𝜏𝐼2
𝜆𝜏 + 𝜌
+
(
𝛽1 − 𝛿2
)
𝐴0,02,𝑎𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎
𝛽1
⎤⎥⎥⎦ ≤ 0 (A.4)
𝐵0,01,𝑎 =
𝜀0,02,𝑎
−𝛿2
𝛿1 − 𝛿2
⎡⎢⎢⎣
𝜆𝜏
(
1 − 𝛿1
) (
𝐷2 −𝐷1
)
(1 + 𝑦𝑎) 𝜀0,02,𝑎
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
)
+
𝛿1𝜆𝜏𝐼2
𝜆𝜏 + 𝜌
− (𝛽1 − 𝛿1)𝐴
0,0
2,𝑎𝜀
0,0
2,𝑎
𝛽1
⎤⎥⎥⎦ ≥ 0 (A.5)
Proposition 1. A trade-off between the two technologies exists if 𝐷1𝐼1 > 𝐷2𝐼2 .
Proof. The electricity price, 𝛼, where the expected NPVs of the profitsof the two technologies are equal is given in (A.6).
𝐷1𝛼 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼1 =
𝐷2𝛼 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼2 ⇒ 𝛼 =
(
𝐼1 − 𝐼2
)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)(
𝐷1 −𝐷2
)
(1 + 𝑎𝑦)
(A.6)
Since the value function must be positive at 𝛼, we have:(
𝐼1 − 𝐼2
)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)(
𝐷1 −𝐷2
)
(1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝐷1 (1 + 𝑎𝑦)
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼1 > 0
⟺
(
𝐼1 − 𝐼2
)
𝐷1 −
(
𝐷1 −𝐷2
)
𝐼1 < 0
Hence, the condition becomes: 𝐼1𝐷2⟨𝐼2𝐷1 ⟺ 𝐷1∕𝐼1⟩𝐷2∕𝐼2. ■
Appendix B. Permanent subsidy retraction
Proposition 2. Greater likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimalinvestment threshold.
Proof. Since technological and policy uncertainty are modelled asindependent Poisson processes, the impact of greater 𝜆𝑝 on the optimalinvestment threshold would be qualitatively the same for each value of
𝜆𝜏 , as demonstrated in the right panel of Figs. 3 and 4. For example,considering the first technology in the absence of the second one(𝜆𝜏 = 0), greater 𝜆𝑝 lowers the expected value of the active projectas indicated in (B.1).
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
𝛷0,11,1(𝐸) =
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
[
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝐸𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
]
< 0 (B.1)
Also, to demonstrate the additive impact of 𝜆𝑝 on the expected valueof the active project for 𝜆𝜏 > 0, we consider the case 𝜆𝜏 → ∞ and theoption to invest in the second technology, 𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸), for 𝐸 < 𝜀0,12,1, which isindicated in the top part of (14). As shown in (B.2), the impact of 𝜆𝑝 on
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) consists of the impact on the expected value from operating thefirst technology (first term) and the impact on the option to invest in thesecond one (second term). Like in (B.1), greater 𝜆𝑝 lowers the expectedvalue from operating the first technology. Also, greater 𝜆𝑝 lowers theexpected value of the embedded option since 𝐴0,12,1𝐸𝜂1 reflects the addedvalue from the subsidy which decreases with greater 𝜆𝑝.
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
𝐹 0,12,1 (𝐸) =
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
[
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝐸𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
<0
+ 𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
[
𝐴0,02,0𝐸
𝛽1 + 𝐴0,12,1𝐸
𝜂1
]
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
<0 (B.2)
Consequently, to facilitate the exposition of the derivation we will showthat that greater likelihood of subsidy retraction raises the optimalinvestment threshold for 𝜆𝜏 = 0. First, note that, based on the generalexpression of 𝛽1, 𝜂1, 𝛿1 and 𝜃1 indicated in (B.3), where 𝑑 = 𝜇−0.5𝜎2, wehave the following relationships: 𝜃1 ≥ 𝜂1 ≥ 𝛽1 ≥ 1 and 𝜃1 ≥ 𝛿1 ≥ 𝛽1 ≥ 1,
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while 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 > 0, 𝜕𝛿1𝜕𝜆𝜏 > 0, 𝜕𝜃1𝜕𝜆𝑝 > 0, and 𝜕𝜃1𝜕𝜆𝜏 > 0.
𝛽1 =
−𝑑 +
√
𝑑2 + 2𝜎2𝜌
𝜎2
𝜂1 =
−𝑑 +
√
𝑑2 + 2𝜎2(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝)
𝜎2
𝛿1 =
−𝑑 +
√
𝑑2 + 2𝜎2(𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏 )
𝜎2
𝜃1 =
−𝑑 +
√
𝑑2 + 2𝜎2(𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏 + 𝜆𝑝)
𝜎2
(B.3)
If 𝜆𝜏 = 0, then (21) simplifies to (B.4). This happens because 𝛿1 =
𝛽1 ⇒ −𝐴
0,1
1,1 = 𝐴
0,1
2,1, and, therefore, the terms involving 𝐴0,12,1, 𝐴0,11,1 and
𝐴0,01,0 cancel out.
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀0,11,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 [
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+
𝛽1𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
+ 𝛽1𝐶
0,1
1,1𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝜂1−1
]
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀0,11,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝛽1 [
𝛽1𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝛽1𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 𝜂1𝐶
0,1
1,1𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝜂1−1
] (B.4)
We start by subtracting the right- from the left-hand side of (B.4) asindicated in (B.5), where 𝐶0,11,1𝜀0,11,1𝜂1−1 = 𝐷1𝜌−𝜇 + 𝐷1𝑦𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝 − 𝐼1𝜀0,11,1 −𝐶0,01,0𝜀0,11,1𝛽1−1.
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+
𝛽1𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
+ 𝛽1
[
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−
𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
− 𝐶0,01,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
]
−
𝛽1𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
−
𝛽1𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
− 𝜂1
[
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−
𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
− 𝐶0,01,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
]
= 0 (B.5)
Next, we rewrite (B.5) as in (B.6).
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
(
1 − 𝜂1
)
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−𝛽1𝐶
0,0
1,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1−𝜂1
[
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
−
𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
−𝐶0,01,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
]
= 0
(B.6)
Finally, we set
𝑀 = 𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
⎡⎢⎢⎣
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
(
1 − 𝜂1
)
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
− 𝛽1𝐶
0,0
1,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
−𝜂1
⎡⎢⎢⎣
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
−
𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
− 𝐶0,01,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
⎤⎥⎥⎦
⎤⎥⎥⎦ (B.7)with the objective to show that 𝑀 > 0, as this would imply that the MCof delaying investment decreases by more than the MB with greater
𝜆𝑝, and, therefore, greater likelihood of subsidy retraction increasesthe marginal value of delaying investment, and, in turn, the optimalinvestment threshold.
𝑀 = 𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
(
1 − 𝜂1
)
𝐷1𝑦
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
−
[
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇
−
𝐼1
𝜀0,11,1
− 𝐶0,01,0𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝛽1−1
]
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
≥ 0 (B.8)
Note that 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝑝 (1−𝜂1)𝐷1𝑦𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝 = 𝐷1𝑦(𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝)2
[
𝜂1 − 1 −
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) 𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
] and, thus,we can rewrite 𝑀 as in (B.9).
𝑀 =
𝐷1𝑦
[
𝜂1 − 1 − (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
]
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 −[ 𝐷1𝜌 − 𝜇− 𝐼1𝜀0,11,1 −𝐶0,01,0𝜀0,11,1
𝛽1−1
]
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
≥ 0
(B.9)
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 𝜀0,11,1 we obtain:⎡⎢⎢⎣𝐶0,01,0𝜀0,11,1
𝛽1 −
⎛⎜⎜⎝
𝐷1𝜀
0,1
1,1
𝜌 − 𝜇
− 𝐼1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎦
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
+
𝐷1𝑦𝜀
0,1
1,1(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 [𝜂1 − 1 − (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝) 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝
]
≥ 0 (B.10)
Note that the first term in (B.10) is positive since 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 > 0 whilethe expression within the brackets can be written as 𝐹 0,01,0 (𝜀0,11,1) −(
𝛷0,01,0
(
𝜀0,11,1
)
− 𝐼1
) and we know that 𝐹 0,01,0 (𝜀0,11,1) > 𝛷0,01,0 (𝜀0,11,1) − 𝐼1 for
𝜀0,11,1 < 𝜀
0,0
1,0, i.e. the expected option value is greater than the expectedNPV at a price level lower than the optimal one. The second termis also positive since 𝐷1𝑦𝜀0,11,1(
𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝
)2 > 0 while 𝜂1 − 1 − (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝) 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 ≥
0 requires that 𝜂1 − 1 ≥ √ 𝜌+𝜆𝑝2𝜎2 or equivalently that √ 𝜌+𝜆𝑝2𝜎2 ≤√
4 ⋅ 𝜌+𝜆𝑝2𝜎2 +
(
𝜇
𝜎2
− 12
)2
−
(
𝜇
𝜎2
+ 12
). For low values of 𝜇 (as in Table 1),
𝜇
𝜎2
≃ 0 and the last condition simplifies to 𝜌+𝜆𝑝2𝜎2 > 13√ 𝜌+𝜆𝑝2𝜎2 , whichholds. ■
Proposition 3. Stepwise investment induces earlier technology adoptionthan a lumpy investment strategy as long as 𝐼1𝐼2 > 𝑦.
Proof. The objective is to show that the lumpy investment threshold,denoted by 𝜀0,0.,1 , is greater than the optimal investment threshold in thefirst technology under stepwise investment. We will show this result forthe case of subsidy retraction. Following a similar process, the sameresult can be shown for the case of subsidy provision as well. In thiscomparison, we ignore technological and policy uncertainty based onthe following reasoning:
• Technological uncertainty does not impact the optimal invest-ment threshold when a firm holds a single investment opportu-nity, as is the case with lumpy investment, only the correspondingoption and project value (Chronopoulos and Siddiqui, 2015).
• Also, with respect to the stepwise investment strategy, techno-logical uncertainty accelerates investment in the first technology.Consequently, in view of showing that 𝜀0,11,1 < 𝜀0,0.,1 , we may ignoretechnological uncertainty as greater 𝜆𝜏 decreases 𝜀0,11,1 relative to
𝜀0,0.,1 .
• From Proposition 2, we know that greater likelihood of sub-sidy retraction raises the optimal investment threshold. Hence,it suffices to show that 𝜀0,11,1 < 𝜀0,0.,1 at the extreme values of 𝜆𝑝,i.e. for 𝜆𝑝 = 0 and 𝜆𝑝 → ∞. In the latter case, the subsidy willbe retracted immediately, and, therefore, the optimal investmentthreshold in both cases is obtained analytically, thus facilitatingthe comparison’’.
First, we consider the case of 𝜆𝑝 = 0 for both lumpy and stepwiseinvestment and the comparison between the optimal thresholds isindicated in (B.11).
𝜀0,0.,1 > 𝜀
0,0
1,1 ⇔
𝛽1
𝛽1 − 1
(
𝐼2 + 𝐼1
)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
𝐷2 (1 + 𝑦)
>
𝛽1
𝛽1 − 1
𝐼1 (𝜌 − 𝜇)
𝐷1 (1 + 𝑦)
⇔
𝐼1 + 𝐼2
𝐷2
>
𝐼1
𝐷1
(B.11)
From Proposition 1 we know that 𝐼1𝐷1 < 𝐼2𝐷2 < 𝐼1+𝐼2𝐷2 and therefore (B.11)holds.Next, we assume that 𝜆𝑝 → ∞ for the case of stepwise investmentand show that 𝜀0,0.,1 > 𝜀0,01,0.
𝛽1
𝛽1 − 1
(
𝐼2 + 𝐼1
)
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
𝐷2 (1 + 𝑦)
>
𝛽1
𝛽1 − 1
𝐼1 (𝜌 − 𝜇)
𝐷1
⇔
𝐼2 + 𝐼1
𝐷2 (1 + 𝑦)
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>
𝐼1
𝐷1
⇔
𝐷1
𝐼1
>
𝐷2 (1 + 𝑦)
𝐼2 + 𝐼1
(B.12)
Note that (B.12) holds due to Proposition 1 if the subsidy is closeto zero, yet will not necessarily hold if 𝑎 = 1. However, by usingProposition 1 we have 𝜀0,0.,1 > 𝜀0,11,1 as long as 𝐼1𝐼2 > 𝑦. ■
Appendix C. Provision of a permanent subsidy
Proposition 4. Greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowers the optimalinvestment threshold.
Proof. Like in Proposition 2, we show this result for the case 𝜆𝜏 = 0 tofacilitate the exposition of the derivation. If 𝜆𝜏 = 0, then (30) can berewritten as in (C.1), since 𝜃1 = 𝜂1.⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀1,01,0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜂1 [
𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
+
𝜂1𝜌𝐼1(
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
)
𝜀1,01,0
+
(
𝜂1 − 𝜂2
)
𝐻1,01,0 𝜀
1,0
1,0
𝜂2−1
]
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 𝐸𝜀1,01,0
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜂1 [
𝜂1𝐷1
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
] (C.1)
By inserting the expression for 𝐻1,01,0 = 1(𝜂1−𝜂2)𝜀0,01,1𝜂2
((
𝜂1 − 𝛽1
)
𝐶0,01,1𝜀
0,0
1,1
𝛽1 −(
𝜂1 − 1
) 𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝜀0,01,1(1+𝑦)
(𝜌−𝜇)
(
𝜌−𝜇+𝜆𝑝
) + 𝜂1 𝜆𝑝𝐼1𝜌+𝜆𝑝
) in (C.1), subtracting the left from theright-hand side and taking the derivative with respect to 𝜆𝑝, we obtain(C.2).
𝐿 = 𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
𝜂1𝐷1(𝜌 − 𝜇) + 𝜆𝑝𝐷1
) [
𝜀0,0
1−𝜂2
1,1 (1 + 𝑦) − 𝜀
1,01−𝜂2
1,0
]
(𝜌 − 𝜇)(𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)
+
𝜂1𝜌𝐼1
[
𝜀1,0
−𝜂2
1,0 − 𝜀
0,0−𝜂2
1,1
]
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ + (𝜂1 − 𝜂2)𝐻
1,0
1,0 log
⎛⎜⎜⎝
𝜀1,01,0
𝜀0,01,1
⎞⎟⎟⎠
𝜕𝜂2
𝜕𝜆𝑝
(C.2)
The objective is to show that 𝐿 < 0, as this would imply that the MBof delaying investment decreases by more than the MC with greater
𝜆𝑝, and, therefore, that greater likelihood of subsidy provision lowersthe marginal value of delaying investment, and, in turn, the optimalinvestment threshold. Below, we consider each term of (C.2) separately.
• We start with the second term on the right-hand side of (C.2) anddetermine its partial derivative with respect to 𝜆𝑝 as in (C.3).
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
𝜂1
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
=
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝) − 𝜂1
(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝)2
<
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝) −
√
𝜌+𝜆𝑝
𝜎2
(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝)2
(C.3)
Note that 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 = 1
𝜎2
√(
𝜇
𝜎2
− 12
)2
+
2(𝜌+𝜆𝑝 )
𝜎2
and by inserting the expres-
sion of 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 in the numerator of (C.3) we obtain: 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 (𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝) −√
𝜌+𝜆𝑝
𝜎2
< 0⇔
(
𝜇
𝜎2
− 12
)2
+ (𝜌+𝜆𝑝)
𝜎2
< 0, which holds.
• Next, we determine the partial derivative of the first term on theright-hand side of (C.2) with respect to 𝜆𝑝, as indicated in (C.4).
𝜕
𝜕𝜆𝑝
𝜂1𝐷1(𝜌 − 𝜇) + 𝜆𝑝𝐷1
(𝜌 − 𝜇)(𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)
=
𝐷1
[
𝜕𝜂1
𝜕𝜆𝑝
(𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 − 𝜇) − 𝜂1 + 1
]
(𝜌 − 𝜇)(𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)2
(C.4)
Similarly, we can show that 𝜕𝜂1𝜕𝜆𝑝 (𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 − 𝜇) − 𝜂1 + 1 < 0, that
𝜀0,0
1−𝜂2
1,1 (1 + 𝑦) − 𝜀
1,01−𝜂2
1,0 < 0, and that 𝜀0,01,1(1 + 𝑦) = 𝜀0,01,0.
• Finally, the third term on the right-hand side of (C.2) is negativebecause 𝜕𝜂2𝜕𝜆𝑝 < 0, while the other terms are positive.
Consequently, the MB of delaying investment decreases by more thanthe MC with greater 𝜆𝑝, which lowers the marginal value of delayinginvestment, thereby raising the investment incentive. ■
Proposition 5. 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)−𝐹 𝑏,𝑐1,𝑎 (𝐸)
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)
∈
[
0, 1 − 1
(1+𝑦)𝛽1
].
Proof. For the case of permanent subsidy retraction (𝑎 = 1, 𝑏 = 0, 𝑐 = 1),the relative loss in option value is outlined in (C.5).
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) − 𝐹
0,1
1,1 (𝐸)
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)
=
(
𝐶0,01,1 − 𝐶
0,0
1,0
)
𝐸𝛽1 − 𝐶0,11,1𝐸
𝜂1
𝐶0,01,1𝐸
𝛽1
(C.5)
We will determine the expression of the relative loss in options for
𝜆𝑝 = 0 and 𝜆𝑝 →∞.
• Notice that 𝜆𝑝 = 0⇒ 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) = 𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸)⇒ 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)−𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸)𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸) = 0.
• By contrast, as 𝜆𝑝 increases, the relative loss increases since
𝐶0,11,1 → 0. Also, notice that 𝜀0,02,1 = 𝜀0,02,01+𝑦 , 𝐴0,02,1 = 𝐴0,02,0 (1 + 𝑦)𝛽1 , and,
𝜀0,01,1 =
𝜀0,01,0
1+𝑦 . Thus, 𝐴0,01,1 = (1 + 𝑦)𝛿1 𝐴0,01,0, and by substituting 𝜀0,01,1, 𝐴0,01,1and 𝐴0,02,1 in the expression for 𝐶0,01,1 , we obtain:
𝐶0,01,1 = (1 + 𝑦)
𝛽1 1
𝜀0,01,1
𝛽1
(𝐷1𝜀0,01,0
𝜌 − 𝜇
−𝐼1+𝐴
0,0
2,0𝜀
0,0
1,0
𝛽1+𝐴0,01,0𝜀
0,0
1,0
𝛿1
)
= (1 + 𝑦)𝛽1 𝐶0,01,0
(C.6)
Hence, 𝐶0,01,1
𝐶0,01,0
= (1 + 𝑦)𝛽1 , and, thus, 𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)−𝐹 0,11,1 (𝐸)
𝐹 0,01,1 (𝐸)
=[
(1+𝑦)𝛽1𝐶0,01,0−𝐶
0,0
1,0
]
𝐸𝛽1−0
𝐶0,01,1𝐸
𝛽1
= 1 − 1
(1+𝑦)𝛽1
.
Following similar steps, we can derive the relative loss in option valuefor the case of permanent subsidy provision. ■
Appendix D. Provision of a retractable subsidy
By solving (33), we obtain (D.1). The first two terms in the toppart reflect the expected profit from operating the first technology. Thethird term represents the option to invest in the second technology inthe permanent absence of a subsidy, adjusted via the last term, sincethe subsidy will be provided and subsequently retracted. Similarly, thefirst three terms in the middle part represent the expected profit fromoperating the second technology, while the last two terms represent thelikelihood of the price either dropping in the waiting region or risingabove 𝜀1,12,0.
𝐹 1,12,0 (𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 + 𝐴0,02,0𝐸𝛽1
+
[
𝜆𝑝𝐴
0,1
2,1
1
2 𝜎
2−𝜂1𝜎2−𝜇
ln𝐸 + 𝐴1,12,0
]
𝐸𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,12,1
𝜆𝑝𝐷2𝐸 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) + 𝜆𝑝𝐷2𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2
− 𝜆𝑝𝜌+𝜆𝑝 𝐼2 + 𝐵
1,1
2,0𝐸
𝜂2 + 𝐶1,12,0𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝜀0,12,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,12,0
𝛷1,12,0(𝐸) − 𝐼2 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,12,0 (D.1)
Similarly, by solving (34) for each expression of 𝐹 1,11,0 (𝐸) that is indi-cated in (D.1), we obtain (D.2). Note that 𝐴1,11,0, 𝐵1,11,0 , 𝐶1,11,0 and 𝐷1,11,0 are
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determined via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between
the three branches.
𝛷1,11,0(𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐷1𝐸
𝜌 − 𝜇
+
𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 + 𝐴0,02,0𝐸𝛽1 + 𝐴0,01,0𝐸𝛿1 + 𝐴1,11,0𝐸𝜃1
+
𝜆𝑝𝐴
0,1
1,1 ln𝐸
1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜃1𝜎2 − 𝜇
𝐸𝜃1 +
(𝜆𝑝
𝜆𝜏
𝐴0,12,1 + 𝐴
1,1
2,0
)
𝐸𝜂1
+
𝜆𝜏𝜆𝑝𝐴
0,1
2,1𝐸
𝜂1
(𝜃2 − 𝜃1)
(
1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜂1𝜎2 − 𝜇
)
1
2𝜎
2
×
[(
𝜂1 − 𝜃1
)
ln𝐸 − 1(
𝜂1 − 𝜃1
)2 −
(
𝜂1 − 𝜃2
)
ln𝐸 − 1(
𝜂1 − 𝜃2
)2
]
,
𝐸 < 𝜀0,12,1[
𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
) + [𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)𝐷1] 𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) (
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
)
+
𝜆𝜏𝐷2
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)
+
𝜆𝜏𝐷2𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 ] 𝜆𝑝𝐸(𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏)
+
𝐷1𝐸(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) + 𝐵0,01,0𝐸𝛿2 + 𝜆𝑝𝐵0,11,1 ln𝐸1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜃2𝜎2 − 𝜇
𝐸𝜃2
−
(
2𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
)
𝜆𝜏𝜆𝑝𝐼2(
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
) (
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
) (
𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏
) + 𝐵1,12,0𝐸𝜂2
+𝐶1,12,0𝐸
𝜂1 + 𝐵1,11,0𝐸
𝜃2 + 𝐶1,11,0𝐸
𝜃1 ,
𝜀0,12,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,12,0
𝜆𝜏𝐷2𝐸 + (𝜌 − 𝜇)𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝜏
) + 𝜆𝑝 [𝜆𝜏𝐷2 + (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝)𝐷1]𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) (
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏
)2
+
𝜆𝑝𝜆𝜏𝐷2𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2 (𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝 + 𝜆𝜏)
+𝐵0,01,0𝐸
𝛿2 +
𝜆𝑝𝐵
0,1
1,1 ln𝐸
1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜃1𝜎2 − 𝜇
𝐸𝜃2 −
𝜆𝜏𝐼2
𝜌 + 𝜆𝜏
+𝐷1,11,0𝐸
𝜃2 ,
𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,12,0
(D.2)
Finally, the expression of 𝐹 1,11,0 (𝐸) is indicated in (D.3), where 𝜀1,11,0,
𝐺1,11,0, 𝐻1,11,0 , and 𝐽 1,11,0 are determined via value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the three branches. The first term on the
top branch of (D.3) is the option to invest in the permanent presence
of a subsidy, adjusted via the second term due to policy uncertainty.
The second branch reflects the expected project value if the subsidy
becomes available, and the bottom branch is expected project value
when the price is high enough so that investment is optimal even in
the absence of a subsidy.
𝐹 1,11,0 (𝐸) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝐶0,01,1𝐸
𝛽1 +
⎛⎜⎜⎝
𝜆𝑝𝐶
0,1
1,1
1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜂1𝜎2 − 𝜇
ln𝐸 + 𝐺1,11,0
⎞⎟⎟⎠𝐸𝜂1 , 𝐸 < 𝜀0,11,1
𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸
(𝜌 − 𝜇)
(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
) + 𝜆𝑝𝐷1𝐸𝑦(
𝜌 − 𝜇 + 𝜆𝑝
)2
−
𝜆𝑝𝐼1
𝜌 + 𝜆𝑝
+ 𝐴0,02,0𝐸
𝛽1 −
𝜆𝑝
𝜆𝜏
𝐴0,11,1𝐸
𝜃1
+
𝜆𝑝𝐴
0,1
2,1 ln𝐸
1
2𝜎
2 − 𝜃1𝜎2 − 𝜇
𝐸𝜂1 +
𝜆𝑝
𝜆𝑝 − 𝜆𝜏
𝐴0,01,0𝐸
𝛿1
+𝐻1,11,0𝐸
𝜂2 + 𝐽 1,11,0𝐸
𝜂1 , 𝜀0,11,1 ≤ 𝐸 < 𝜀1,11,0
𝛷1,11,0(𝐸) − 𝐼1 , 𝐸 ≥ 𝜀1,11,0 (D.3)
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